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1. INTRODUCTION
During the normal operation of a CANDU reactor, 
fission product gases accumulate in the fuel-to-sheath 
gap as the uranium dioxide fuel pellets experience nu-
clear fission. When a fuel sheath fails during normal 
reactor operations, coolant can enter the fuel-to-sheath 
gap, releasing fission products such as volatile species 
of noble gases or iodine into the primary heat transport 
system coolant.1. Nuclear fuel can be damaged under un-
expected circumstances in a reactor. Fuel rods can fail 
as a result of debris fretting, delayed hydrogen cracking, 
and other factors. There are generally four causes of fuel 
defects, as outlined in Table 1.2
After many years of operation in CANDU reactors, 
the use of on-power failed fuel detection and location 
systems, along with alarm area gamma monitors, have 
successfully demonstrated that most, if not all, defective 
and suspect fuel bundles can be located before discharge 
to the reception bay. In general, only visual inspection 
has been used in the reception bay to identify suspect 
bundles. CANDU reactors in Korea have a delayed neu-
tron detection system for locating failed bundles. Other 
methods are only available for identifying and locating 
failed fuel, including coolant sampling techniques and 
online gaseous fission product (GFP) monitoring of dis-
solved fission products in the primary coolant. There is 
no efficient method of confirming that a defective bundle 
has been discharged, other than observing a decrease in 
coolant activity levels. When a CANDU reactor has a 
defective fuel bundle during its operation, the defective 
fuel bundle should be discharged by releasing two fuel 
bundles at a time from the corresponding fuel channel 
until the failed fuel bundle is found. GFP and delayed 
neutron monitoring systems cannot precisely distinguish 
failed fuel elements from each fuel bundles. Discharged 
bundles are transferred from the storage pool to the 
modular air-cooled storage canister facilities that store 
the intact fuel bundles. An integrity assessment of spent 
fuel bundles irradiated in a CANDU reactor is needed 
to separate any suspect or defective bundles with fission 
products released in detectable quantities. Therefore, a 
sipping system was designed and built to enclose an ir-
radiated bundle inside a sealed container at the bottom of 
the reception bay. The integrity of spent fuel bundles was 
assessed by this sipping system. This study investigated 
the integrity assessment of spent fuel bundles by using 
a sipping system in a CANDU reactor. The integrity 
assessment results have shown promise for this nonde-
structive sipping test. 
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2. EXPERIMENTAL 
2.1 Fluid Analysis of the Sipping System
Sipping is the most common technique used to lo-
cate fuel failures in both Pressurized Water Reactors 
(PWRs) and Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs). Identifi-
cation of fuel rod failure is based on detecting the ac-
tivity of fission products released through defects during 
sipping.3 The measured radioisotopes include krypton, 
xenon, cesium, and iodine.4 The widely known sipping 
technology used for inspecting defective fuel is largely 
divided into vacuum sipping, dry sipping, wet sipping, or 
in-mast sipping, depending on physical phenomena and 
the state of the fission products to be detected. However, 
in a CANDU reactor, only visual inspection in the recep-
tion bay has been used to identify suspect bundles. The 
Korea institute for nuclear safety (KINS) recommended 
the enforcement of continuous integrity assessments 
of the spent fuel bundles. This study adopted a sipping 
measurement technology to determine the radioactivity 
of gases and liquid samples holding fission products in 
a CANDU reactor. The sipping system employed two 
types of gamma detectors to increase the reliability of 
measurement and used the vacuum process for fission 
nuclides that may escape through defects or holes in the 
fuel element. The flow schematic diagram of the sipping 
system is shown in Fig. 1.
 The sipping system consisted of a canister, valve, 
pump, stand, piping, and fittings. V means valve; for 
Fig. 1. Flow Schematic Diagram of the Sipping System
Table 1. Causes of Defective CANDU Fuel Elements
Causes of Failure Description of Mechanism
Debris Fretting Debris, carried by the coolant, circulates around the primary heat transfer system (PHTS), which can cause fretting of the fuel sheath if this debris is lodged between adjacent elements.
Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) Corrosive iodine fission products that are produced during the nuclear fission process in the fuel pellets can result in sheath cracking with pellet-sheath interaction during power ramping maneuvers.
Delayed Hydrogen Cracking Hydrogen can diffuse to areas of high stress and low temperature, resulting in cracking near end-cap welds.
Manufacturing Flaws The end caps of the fuel elements may have possible faulty welds or fabrication flaws (porous bar stock).
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standard system of KRISS, as shown in Fig. 2. The cali-
bration source used 137Cs with 1μCi (6.132X104Bq (Dec. 
12. 1979). The geometry factor was 0.5. The power of 
800 volts direct current(VDC) was supplied. The same 
disk source supplied the developed system and the stand-
ard system. 
2.3 Performance Test of the Sipping System
The performance test assessed the feasibility of in-
specting the fuel integrity in a CANDU reactor by using 
the sipping system. The sipping system was installed in 
the reception bay of Wolsung Unit 4. Five intact spent 
fuel bundles among the discharged fuel bundles were se-
lected for the feasibility test.
2.4 Application of the Sipping System
The sipping system was used to assess the integrity 
of spent fuel bundles in a CANDU reactor. Four spent 
fuel bundles were selected as suspected fuel bundles in 
Wolsung Unit 4 and the integrity assessment was per-
formed by using the sipping test. The surfaces of the 
outer fuel elements were visually tested. In addition, the 
integrity of spent fuel bundles was assessed in Wolsung 
Unit 2. The four suspect fuel bundles were inspected to 
locate the failed fuel bundle. The sipping system and the 
visual inspection system were applied to inspect fuel in-
tegrity.
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
3.1 Fluid Analysis of the Sipping System
The fluid mechanics in the canister of the sipping sys-
tem were analyzed by using computational fluid dynam-
ics. The velocity vector in the canister of the sipping sys-
which air operated rotary ball valves were used. P means 
pump. The maximum flow rate of the pump was 133 liter 
per minute. The system was installed in the reception bay 
of a CANDU reactor to prevent the fuel inserted in the 
canister from leaking to the outside. For waterproofing, 
the canister was sealed with radioactivity-resistant pol-
yurethane. The canister, coupled with the valve console, 
was installed on the bottom of the reception bay at a depth 
of 5 m. The control unit consisted of programmable logic 
controller (PLC) -based control equipment and a flow-
chart diagram display. The system panel, which was a 
box-shaped structure installed on an operation space out-
side the storage pool, included a local power panel elec-
trically controlling pumps and valves, an air service unit 
supplying compressed air, and a valve controlling fluid 
flow. The NaI scintillation detector and other analysis 
circuits measured gamma rays from liquid samples. The 
range of energy to be measured was 50 keV–3.5 MeV. 
The analysis of fluid mechanics was performed us-
ing the FLUENT software developed by ATES Company 
under the Boussinesq assumption, in the Laboratory of 
Mechanical Engineering department at Chungnam Na-
tional University5. The inside fluid flow of the canister 
was treated as incompressible fluid.
2.2 Acceptance Test of the Sipping System
An acceptance test was used to test the energy reso-
lution, sensitivity, and counting precision of a count-
ing device of the sipping system. The test was per-
formed in the Korea Research Institute of Standards and 
Science(KRISS) in accordance with the National Metrol-
ogy Institute of Korea’s bylaws based on the Framework 
Act for National Standards. The test was conducted as per 
the quality control of nuclear medicine instruments pro-
posed by the nternational Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) 
6. The sipping system was lined up in parallel to the 
Fig. 2. Diagram of the Performance Test for the Sipping System
PARK et al., Current Status of Integrity Assessment by Sipping System of Spent Fuel Bundles Irradiated in CANDU Reactor
NUCLEAR ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY,  VOL.46  NO.6  DECEMBER 2014 NUCLEAR ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY,  VOL.46  NO.6  DECEMBER 2014878 879
3.2 Acceptance Test of the Sipping System
Energy resolution is the ability of the detector to 
accurately determine the energy of the incoming radia-
tion; this is a very important parameter in determining 
the overall acceptance of a sipping system. An important 
measurement to assess the efficiency of the scintillation 
counting device is full width at half maximum (FWHM). 
The formula for determining the energy level percentage 
of a particular radionuclide is 
tem is shown in Fig. 3. The velocity at the entrance of the 
canister was 3.75 m/s and that at the outlet was 6.40 m/s. 
The velocity distribution in the canister of the sipping 
system is shown in Fig. 4. The velocity in the entrance 
of the canister was almost twice as fast as in the outlet of 
the canister. However the ejection velocity of the orifice 
in the entrance of the canister was lower than that of the 
orifice in the outlet of the canister. In the inner flow of 
the sipping system, the canister provided a smooth flow 
of coolant through the fuel bundles. It was found that the 
sipping system easily and efficiently located the failed 
fuel bundle. It was found that the sipping system could 
monitor the fission product by circulation of the coolant 
inside of the failed fuel bundles.
Fig. 3. Velocity Vector in the Canister
Fig. 4. Velocity Distribution in the Canister
(1)
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where R(Er): energy resolution (%), Er: mono-photon 
energy (keV).
Energy resolution is expressed as a percentage of the 
FWHM of a specific energy. In the energy resolution test 
of the sipping system, the energy resolution was 6.51%. 
The energy resolution of the KRISS standard was 6.57%. 
The difference between the sipping system and the stand-
ard was less than 7%. The comparison between the sip-
ping system and the KRISS standard showed a margin 
of error for the sipping system of approximately 0.91%. 
Because this error margin of 0.91% is less than 1%, the 
performance of the sipping system in the energy resolu-
tion was equal to that of the standard of KRISS.
Sensitivity testing was performed by measurements 
on a certified 137Cs gamma-radiation source under the test 
conditions shown in Table 2. The formula for determin-
ing the sensitivity is 
where E(Ab): counting efficiency (%), CPS: count per 
second, DPS: disintegration per second.
Table 2 shows the conditions of the sensitivity test. 
In the sensitivity test of the sipping system, the sensi-
tivity was 12.19%. The sensitivity of the KRISS standard 
was 12.13%. The difference between the sipping system 
and the standard was less than 0.06%. The comparison 
between the sipping system and the KRISS standard 
showed a margin of error for the sipping system of ap-
proximately 0.49%. Because this error margin of 0.49% 
is less than 1%, the sensitivity of the sipping system was 
almost the same as the sensitivity of the standard.
The counting precision test calculates the value of x2 
under the test conditions shown in Table 3 from the fol-
lowing relationship: 
(2)
(3)
Item Contents
Radioactivity Source 137Cs
Radioactivity
1 μCi (6.132 × 104 Bq
(Dec. 12, 1979), point source
Energy Window Main photon peak (KeV) ± 10%
Distance of Detection
Attachment of source on the surface
of the detector
Counting Time 1,000 s
Table 2.  Sensitivity Test Conditions
Item Contents
Radioactivity Source 137Cs
Radioactivity 1 μCi (6.132 × 10
4 Bq
(Dec. 12, 1979), point source
Energy Window Main photon peak (KeV) ± 10%
Distance of Detection
Attachment of source on the surface
of the detector
Counting Time 1,000 s
Repetition of Detection 5 times
Table 3.  Test Conditions for Counting Precision
Table 4. Detection Count for Accuracy in Sipping System 
Counting Rate
(C1)
Avg. Counting Rate 
(C(m))
C1 – C(m) (C1 – C(m))
2 ∑(C1 − C(m))
2
3,841 cps
3,838 cps
3 9
315
3,842 cps 4 16
3,846 cps 8 64
3,823 cps -15 225
3,839 cps 1 1
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confirmed as the radioactivity of intact spent fuel bun-
dles. The functional test of the sipping system was per-
formed as shown in Table 6.
This performance test in a CANDU reactor success-
fully proved that the sipping technology was effectively 
used to assess the integrity of spent fuel bundles irradi-
ated in the reception bay. The threshold value for the dis-
crimination of fuel failure was also confirmed from the 
radioactivity data measured by the sipping system.
3.4 Application of the Sipping System
In Wolsung Unit 4, no defective fuel element was 
found, although there was a small scratch on the surface 
of the fuel element, as shown in Fig. 5. The sipping sys-
tem employed two types of gamma detectors to increase 
the reliability of measurement and used the vacuum pro-
cess for fission nuclides that may escape through defects 
or holes in the fuel element. Two gamma detectors were 
where x2: counting precision, C1: an individual count, 
C(m): mean of the 10 counts.
The results of the counting precision test of the sip-
ping system are shown in Table 4. The results of counting 
precision for the KRISS standard are shown in Table 5. 
In the calculation results of Equation (3), the count-
ing precision of the sipping system was 8.2 and that of 
the KRISS standard was 5.9. These calculations meet the 
international quality control requirement of a value less 
than 16.92.5 The difference between the sipping system 
and the standard was 0.88%. Therefore, the detection 
performance of the sipping system was verified.
3.3 Performance Test of the Sipping System
Three basic gamma activities were measured: back-
ground, liquid gross, and gas gross. The radioactivity of 
fuel bundles according to the sipping test showed almost 
twice as much background level. This radioactivity was 
Table 6. Functional Test Results of the Sipping System
Contents Test results
Canister Sealing, Pump and Valve
- Canister sealing: Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer (EPDM)for radiation 
resistance
- Pump performance: 2HP, 133 L/min
- Valve operation in water: good
System Condition and Operating Program
- Pressure meter: Max 10 kg/㎠
- Flowmeter: turbine type, max. 38 L/min
- Operating manual/auto program: good
Detector Performance
- Min. detectability: 0.01 Bq/cc
- Shielding thickness of detector: Lead, 5.08cm
- Operating MCA program: good 
Material Suitability - Main material: stainless steel- Flexible hose: polyurethane
Table 5. Detection Count for Accuracy in Standard
Counting Rate
(C1)
Avg. Counting Rate 
(C(m))
C1 – C(m) (C1 – C(m))
2 ∑(C1 − C(m))
2
3,805 cps
3,804 cps
1 1
226
3,810 cps 6 36
3,812 cps 8 64
3,793 cps -11 121
3,802 cps -2 4
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examined for 100 s by a gamma detector because it emit-
ted unnecessarily high radioactivity. The radioactivity 
levels of “E,” “F,” and “G” fuel bundles were within two 
times the background value equivalent to the radioactiv-
ity of the intact fuel bundle. In case of fuel bundle “H,” 
the radioactivity level was over 30 times that of the BKG 
level in fission nuclides of Xe and Kr. No fission nuclides 
were found in fuel bundles “E,” “F,” or “G.”
The radioactivity of “A” fuel bundle in Wolsung Unit 
4 and that of "H" fuel bundle in Wolsung Unit 2 showed 
too high a level of radioactivity. Therefore these fuel bun-
dles were classed as the failed fuel bundles. The Gaseous 
Fission Product and delayed neutron monitoring systems 
along with alarm area gamma monitors in a CANDU re-
actor could monitor the coolant activity of the suspect 
fuel bundles. Then the failed fuel bundle was detected 
by the sipping system in the spent fuel storage bay. The 
validation of this method could be done by the poolside 
examination after disassembling the fuel bundle.
installed in the sipping system alternately. The results of 
the sipping test are shown in Fig. 6. Fuel bundle “A” in 
Fig. 6 was one hundred times more radioactive than the 
background(BKG) level in the fission nuclides of Xe and 
Kr. The Xe-133 nuclide was also detected by the gamma 
detector, as shown in Fig. 7. Any indication outside the 
bundle A was not found. Fuel bundles “B,” “C,” and “D” 
were just two or three times more radioactive than the 
BKG level, which was the radioactivity level correspond-
ing to intact fuel. In addition, no fission nuclide was 
found in any other fuel bundles, except activated corro-
sion products like Ni-57, Cu-61, and Co-56.
In Wolsung Unit 2, the four suspect fuel bundles were 
inspected to locate the failed fuel bundle. This visual in-
spection determined that “H” fuel had a defect on the end 
plug of the fuel element, as shown in Fig. 8. Sipping test-
ing was performed for the fuel bundles just after visual 
testing. The radioactivity levels of fuel bundles examined 
for 300 s are shown in Fig. 9. Failed fuel bundle “H” was 
Fig. 5. Visual Inspection of Fuel Bundles in Wolsung Unit
Fig. 6. Sipping test results in Wolsung Unit 4
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4. CONCLUSIONS
A sipping system was developed to assess the integ-
rity of spent fuel bundles irradiated in a CANDU reactor. 
The analysis of fluid mechanics in the sipping system us-
ing computational fluid dynamics showed a smooth flow 
of coolant through the fuel bundles. The acceptance test 
results of the sipping system performed in KRISS showed 
that the energy resolution, sensitivity, and counting pre-
cision of the counting device were almost the same as 
detailed in the KRISS standard. The performance test in 
a CANDU reactor confirmed the threshold value for the 
discrimination of fuel failure from the radioactivity data 
measured by the sipping system. The integrity assess-
ment of spent fuel bundles was successfully performed 
by the sipping system, and has shown promise as a non-
destructive test for detecting defective fuel bundles in a 
CANDU reactor. 
Fig. 7. Xe-133 Fission Nuclide Spectrum of Fuel Bundle “A”
Fig. 8. Visual Inspection of Fuel Bundles in Wolsung Unit 2 Fig. 9. Sipping Inspection Results in Wolsung Unit 2
